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INTRODUCnON
In light of two implications of urban renewal, it is not at all surprising that this
phenomenon provides an excellent area for the application of welfare economics.
These implications are: First, that the market mechanism has not functioned "prop-
erly" in urban property; and second, that positive action can "improve" the situation.
The propositions of welfare economics provide some tools for judging public policy
measures such as urban renewal. But since these propositions themselves are based
upon ethical postulates, it seems desirable that we begin our discussion of urban
renewal by stating explicitly what we consider the role of the economist to be in this
situation.
I
WELFARE EcONO0MICS AND URBAN RENEWAL
Welfare economics itself provides one criterion, the Pareto condition, for judging
public policy measures. The Pareto condition states that a social policy measure can
be judged "desirable" if it results in either (x) everyone being made better off, or (2)
someone being made better off without anyone being made worse off. This rule
is, of course, an ethical proposition, but it requires a minimum of premises and
should command wide assent.
On the other hand, the economist need not be limited solely to the Pareto condi-
tion in giving policy advice. This becomes especially true when the objective am-
biguity of the terms "better off" and "worse off" is considered. Indeed, the role of
the economist in the formation of social policy may be compared to that of the
consultant to an industrial firm. The consultant to a firm serves two functions.
First, given the goals of the firm, he tries to find the best or most efficient means of
achieving these goals. The second function of the consultant is equally important;
he must try to clarify vague goals by pointing out possible inconsistencies and de-
termining implications in order that re-evaluations and explicit statements can be
made.
We conceive of the role of the economist as quite similar to that outlined for
the consultant. First, the economist may try to clarify social goals by pointing out
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inconsistencies and determining implications of possible social rules. Second, if a
goal happens to be given and agreed upon-i.e., if a social welfare function is
defined-then the economist might try to advise the body politic by proposing
policies for the attainment of the defined goals.
It is in the above spirit that we consider the problem of urban renewal. Granted
the individualistic basis of western civilization, it seems reasonable to assume that
any action which satisfies the Pareto condition would improve social welfare and,
therefore, should be desired by society. On the other hand, society might desire,
granted the institutional form of political decision-making, certain actions which
violate the narrowly conceived Pareto condition.1 Certainly income redistribution
would fit this category. And so may urban renewal.
Specifically, the social welfare function which we use has the following properties:
If the sum of the benefits, measured by changes in capital values, exceeds the sum
of the costs, then the action is termed desirable. While this welfare criterion may
not seem clear at this point, it is appropriate to note here that a major portion of
the remainder of the-paper will be devoted to determining how benefits and costs
are to be measured. What is important here is to make clear the basis upon which
our judgments will be made.
Several characteristics of this welfare criterion- should be noted here'. First, any
action which satisfies the narrowly conceived Pareto condition will satisfy this
criterion. On the other hand, any action which satisfies the welfare criterion need
not meet the Pareto condition unless compensation is required. Second, our criterion
is concerned with the efficient allocation of resources. The question of the ethically
desirable distribution of income will not be considered here, although some might
hold that urban renewal is concerned with income redistribution. We merely point
out that income redistribution can be more effiuently achieved through other means
than urban renewal.
II
THE PRICE MECHANISM AND URBAN BLIGHT
Having stated the position from which we shall make policy judgments, we now
must examine the question of why urban renewal is necessary. In other words, why
do "blighted" areas develop and persist? Why do individuals fail to keep their
properties in "acceptable" states of repair?
Several arguments may be advanced as answers to the above questions. For
example, it has been asserted that property owners have exaggerated notions of the
extent and timing of municipal expansion. Hence they may neglect possible
improvements of existing structures in anticipation of the arrival of more intensive
uses which might bring capital gains Note that even if this argument is accepted
' It is worthy of note that it can be argued very convincingly, if the individualistic ethic is adopted,
that any social welfare function must satisfy a broadly conceived Pareto condition-that is, a Parcto condi-
tion defined by political consensus. See, e.g., Buchanan, Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and
Political Economy, 2 J. LAw & ECONOMICS 124 (1959).
'Fisher, Economic A4sects of Zoning, Blighted Areas, and Rehabilitation Laws, 3 Am. Ecom. Ry.V 334
(1942).
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as plausible-and the reason why property owners might have exaggerated notions
about municipal expansion is by no means evident-it does not constitute an argu-
ment for urban renewal. Instead, one might infer that, given sufficient time, a
transition to intensive and profitable uses would take place? Then too, it can be
argued that there is no reason to expect governmental authorities to have better
judgment than individual entrepreneurs.
Aside from the previous "mistaken judgments" argument, it might seem plausible
at first glance to believe on the basis of price theory and the profit maximization
assumption that urban blight could not occur. After all, would not profit-
maximizing individuals find it to their advantage to keep their property in a state of
repair? Certainly it seems reasonable to suppose that if individual benefits from
repair or redevelopment exceed individual costs, then individual action could be
expected and no social action would be necessary. We shall now attempt to demon-
strate why rational individual action might allow property to deteriorate and blight
to occur.
First of all, the fact that the value of any one property depends in part upon the
neighborhood in which it is located seems so obvious as hardly to merit discussion.
Yet, since this simple fact is the villain of the piece, further elaboration is warranted.
Pure introspective evidence seems sufficient to indicate that persons consider the
neighborhood when deciding to buy or rent some piece of urban property4 If this
is the case, then it means that externalities are present in utility functions; that is
to say, the subjective utility or enjoyment derived from a property depends not only
upon the design, state of repairs, and so on of that property, but also upon the
characteristics of nearby properties. This fact will, of course, be reflected in both
capital and rental values. This is the same as saying that it is also reflected in the
return on investment.
In order to explain how interdependence can cause urban blight, it seems appro-
priate to introduce a simple example from the theory of games. This example,
which has been developed in an entirely different context and is commonly known
as "The Prisoner's Dilemma," appears to contain the important points at issue here.5
"Indeed, it can even be argued that this line of reasoning considered alone leads to the conclusion
that urban renewal expenditures are wasteful. See, e.g., Davis, A Pure Theory of Urban Renewal, 36
LAND ECONOMICS 221 (xg6o).
'This interdependence of urban property values has, of course, long been recognized. See, for
example, the discussion in ALFRED NIARS-ALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECoNoMICs bk. 5, ch. ii (8th ed. 5920).
The following quote is especially interesting in this regard. "But the general rule holds that the amount
and character of the building put upon each plot of land is, in the main (subject to the local building
bylaws), that from which the most profitable results are anticipated, with little or no reference to its
reaction on the situation value of the neighorhood. In other words, the site value of the plot is governed
by causes which are mostly beyond the control of him who determines what buildings shall be put on it."
Id. at 445.
For an explanation of the "game theoretic" points of interest in the Prisoner's Dilemma example, see
R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIP^A, GANIS AND DEcIsio.s 94-102 (957). The reason for the in-
triguing title of this type of game theory analysis is interesting in itself. The name is derived from a
popular interpretation. The district attorney takes two suspects into custody and keeps them separated.
He is sure they are guilty of a specific crime but does not have adequate evidence for a conviction.
He talks to each separately and tells them that they can confess or not confess. If neither confesses, then
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For the sake of simplicity, let us consider only two adjaccnt properties. More general
situations do not alter the result but do complicate the reasoning. Let us use the
labels Owner I and Owner II. Suppose that each owner has made an initial invest-
ment in his property from which he is reaping a return, and is now trying to
determine whether to make the additional investment for redevelopment. The
additional investment will, of course, alter the return which he receives, and so will
the decision of the other owner.
The situation which they might face can be summarized in the following game
matrix:
Owner II
Invest Not Invest
Invest ((.o7,.o7) (.03, .1o))
Owner I Not Invest (. .03) (.o4, .o4)/
The matrix game is given the following interpretation: Each property owner has
made an initial investment and has an additional sum which is invested in, say,
corporate bonds. At present, the average return on both these investments, the
property and the corporate bonds considered together, is four per cent. Thus if
neither owner makes the decision to sell his corporate bonds and make a new
investment in the redevelopment of his property, each will continue to get the four
per cent average return. This situation is represented by the entries within brackets
in the lower right of the matrix where each individual has made the decision "Not
Invest." The left hand figure in the brackets always refers to the average return
which Owner I receives, and the right hand figure reflects the return of Owner II.
Thus for the "Not Invest, Not Invest" decisions, the matrix entry reflects the fact
that both owners continue to get a four per cent return.
'On the other hand, if both individuals made the decision to sell their bonds and
invest the proceeds in redevelopment of their property, it is assumed that each would
obtain an average return of seven per cent on his total investment. Therefore, the
entry in the upper left of the matrix, the entry for the "Invest, Invest" decisions, has
a seven per cent return for each owner.
The other two entries in the matrix, which represent the situation when one
owner invests and the other does not, are a little more complicated. We assumed,
as was mentioned earlier, that externalities, both external economies and diseconomies,
are present. These interdependencies are reflected in the returns from investment.
For example, consider the entries in the brackets in the lower left corner of the
matrix. In this situation, Owner I would have decided to "Not Invest" and Owner
II would have decided to "Invest."
he will book them on some minor charge and both will receive minor punishment. If both confess, then
they will be prosecuted but he will recommend less than the most severe sentence. If either one con-
fesses and the other does not, then the confessor will receive lenient treatment for turning state's evidence,
whereas the latter will get "the book" slapped at him. The Prisoner's Dilemma is that without col-
lusion between them, the individually -rational action for each is to confess.
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Owner I is assumed to obtain some of the benefits from Owner II's investment,
the redevelopment contributing something to a "better neighborhood" For example,
if the two properties under consideration happened to be apartment buildings, the
decision of Owner II to invest might mean that he would demolish his "out-dated"
apartment building and construct a new one complete with off-street parking and
other amenities. But this would mean that the tenants of Owner I would now
have an easier time finding p.rking spaces on the streets, their children might
have the opportunity of associating with the children of the "higher class" people
who might be attracted to the modern apartment building, and so forth. All this
means that (as soon as leases allow) Owner I can edge up his rents. Thus his return
is increased without having to make an additional investment. We assume that his
return becomes ten per cent in this case, and this figure is appropriately entered in
the matrix. Owner II, on the other hand, would find that, since his renters also
consider the "neighborhood" (which includes the ill effects of Owner I's "out-dated"
structure), his level of rents would have to be less than would be the case if his apart-
ment building were in an alternative location. Thus we assume that the return on
his total investment (the investment in the now-demolished structure plus the
investment in the new structure) falls to three per cent. This figure is also
appropriately entered in the matrix. For simplicity, the reverse situation, where
Owner I decided to invest and Owner II decides not to invest, is taken to be similar.
Thus the reverse entries are made in the upper right corner of the matrix.
Having described the possible situations which the two owners face, consider now
.the decision-making process. Both owners are assumed to be aware of the returns
which are available to themselves in the hypothesized situations. Owner I will be
considered first. Owner I must decide whether to invest or not invest. Remember
that the left hand entries in the brackets represent the possible returns for Owner I.
Two possible actions of Owner II are relevant for Owner I in his effort to make his
own decision. Therefore, Owner I might use the following decision process:
Assume, first, that Owner II decides to invest. Then what decision would be the
most advantageous? A decision to invest means only a seven per cent return on
Owner I's capital, whereas the decision not to invest would yield an average return
of ten per cent of the total relevant amount of capital. Therefore, if Owner II were
to decide to invest, it would certainly be individually advantageous to Owner I not
to invest. But suppose that Owner II decided not to invest. Then what would
be the most advantageous decision for Owner I? Once again the results can be
seen from the matrix. For Owner I the decision to invest now means that he will
* Economists might think that we have used inappropriate and sleight-of-hand methods by lumping
together old and new investments, and also by considering the average rate of return instead of marginal
rates. Actually these methods are completely appropriate here due to the way we have simplified the
problem to make the exposition of the game theory easier. The old investment does not represent a sunk
cost, since it is yielding a return and thus has economic value. Both owners are assumed to have pre-
cisely the amount of money in bonds that is required for the redevelopment of their property. The rate
of return on the bonds can be assumed to be the "social rate of return" and the best alternative available
to the two individuals. Since the owners are interested in maximizing the total income from their
capital, the above assumptions allow us to lump together and to use average rates.
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receive only a three per cent return on his capital, whereas the decision not to invest
means that he can continue to receive the four per cent average return. Therefore, if
Owner II were to decide not to invest, it would still be individually advantageous
to Owner I not to invest.
The situation for Owner II is similar. If Owner I is assumed to invest, then
Owner II can gain a ten per cent average return on his capital by not investing and
only a seven per cent return by investing. If Owner I is assumed not to invest, then
Owner II can gain only a three per cent return by investing, but a four per cent
average return by not investing. Therefore, the individually rational action for
Owner II is also not to invest.
The situation described above means, of course, that neither Owner I nor Owner
II will decide to invest in redevelopment. Therefore, we might conclude that the
interdependencies summarized in the Prisoner's Dilemma example can explain why
blighted areas can develop 7 and persist. Before concluding the analysis, however,
we might try to answer some questions which may at this point be forthcoming.
First of all, it might be suggested that we have imposed an unrealistic condition
by not allowing the two owners to coordinate their decisions.8 After all, does it not
seem likely that the two owners would get together and mutually agree to invest
in the redevelopment of their properties? Not only would such action be socially
desirable, but it would seem to be individually advantageous. Note that while it
might be easy for the two property owners in our simple example to communicate
and coordinate their decisions,' this would not appear to be the case as the number
of individuals increased. If any single owner were to decide not to invest while
all other owners decided to redevelop, then the former would stand to gain by such
action. The mere presence of many owners would seem to make coordination more
difficult and thus make our assumption more realistic. Yet, this is precisely the
point; it is the objective of social policy to encourage individuals in such situations
to co-ordinate their decisions so that interdependencies will not prevent the achieve-
ment of a Pareto welfare point. In this regard, it is worthwhile to note that, if
coordination and redevelopment do take place voluntarily, then no problem exists,
and urban renewal is not needed.
Second, it might be observed that, if coordinated action does not take place,
incentive exists for either Owner I, Owner II, or some third party to purchase the
properties and develop both of them in order that the seven per cent return can be
'It is to be emphasized that these results depend upon the interdependencies or neighborhood effects
being "sufficiently strong" to get a combination of returns similar to those which we used in the example.
It is unlikely that this condition would be satisfied for all urban property. Our point is that similar
combinations seem possible, and if they do occur, then they can explain one peculiar phenomenon of
urban property. The explanation is presented later in the paper.
" It is worthy of note that experimental data concerning the prisoner's dilemma in other contexts
tend to indicate that, if communication does not take place, players continually choose individually rational
strategies. For the results of these laboratory experiments, see Scodel, Minas, Ratoosh & Lipetz, Some
Descriptive Aspctrs of Two-Person Non-Zero-Sum Games, 3 J. Co.,4-Lscr RasoLtrrioH 114 (1959).
'It will be recalled that we made the example overly simple only for the purpose of exposition.
While the consideration of many individuals would make the example more realistic, it would only make
the game theory more complicated and not alter the result as far as this case is concerned.
obtained. And certainly, it cannot be denied that this often occurs in reality.
However, it is necessary to point out here that, because of the institutional pecularities
of urban property, there is no assurance that such a result will always take place.
Consider, for example, an area composed of many holdings. Suppose that renewal
or redevelopment would be feasible if coordination could be achieved, but that indi-
vidual action alone will not result in such investment due to the interdependencies.
In other words, the situation is assumed to be similar to the previous example except
that many owners are present. Incentive exists for some entrepreneur to attempt to
purchase the entire area and invest in redevelopment or renewal.
Now suppose that one or more of the owners of the small plots in the area
became aware of the entrepreneur's intentions. If the small plots were so located as
to be iaportant for a successful projcct, thea the small holders-might realize that
it would be possible to gain by either (I) using their position to expropriate part
of the entrepreneur's expected profits by demanding a very high price for their
properties, or (2) refusing to sell in order to enjoy the external economies generated
by the redevelopment. If several of the small holders become aware-of the entre-
preneur's intentions, then it is entirely possible, with no communication or collusion
between these small holders, for a situation to result where each tries to expropriate
as much of the entrepreneur's profit as possible by either of the above methods. This
competition can result in a Prisoner's Dilemma type of situation for the small holders.
Individually rational action on their part may result in the cancellation of the project
by the entrepreneur. Indeed, anyone familiar with the functioning of the urban
property market must be aware of such difficulties and of the care that must be taken
to prevent price-gouging when an effort is made to assemble some tract of land °
If the above analysis is correct, then it is clear that situations may exist where
individually rational action may not allow for socially desirable investment in the
redevelopment of urban properties. Now such situations need not-indeed, in
general will not--exist in all urban properties. The results of the analysis not only
required special assumptions about the nature of investment returns caused by
interdependencies, but it was also shown that, due to the special institutional char-
acter of tract assembly, the presence of numerous small holdings can block entre-
preneurial action for redevelopment. These two conditions may or may not be filled
for any given tract of land. However, we now may use the above results to define
urban blight.11  Blight is said to exist whenever (I) strictly individual action does
not result in redevelopment, (2) the coordination of decision-making via some
means would result in redevelopment, and (3) the sum of benefits from renewal
"oFor example, Raymond Vernon states, "As the city developed, most of its land was cut up in small
parcels and covered with durable structures of one kind or another. The problem of assembling these
sites, in the absence of some type of condemnation power, required a planning horizon of many years
and a willingness to risk the possibility of price gouging by the last holdout." RAYMOND VERNON, THE
COANGING Economic FuacroN oF T11E CENTRAL CITY 53 (959).
" It is to be pointed out and emphasized that our definition of the term "blight" does not seem to be
what is meant by the term in common usage where it has a connotation of absolute obsolescence. Our
definition refers to the misuse of land in general and carries no such connotation. The difference in
meanings is unfortunate, but we could not find a more appropriate term.
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could exceed the sum of costs. These conditions must be filled. We shall devote a
major portion of the latter part of the paper to making this definition operational;
but, for the moment let it suffice for us to point out two factors. First, it is a
problem of social policy to develop methods whereby blighted areas can be recognized
and positive action can be taken to facilitate either redevelopment or renewal.
Second, and this point may be controversial, blight is not necessarily associated with
the outward appearance of properties in any area.
Since this second point may be subtle and seem contrary to intuitive ideas about
blight, further discussion may be warranted. Note that we have defined blight
strictly in relation to the allocation of resources. The fact that the properties in
an area have a "poor" appearance may or may not be an indication of blight and
the malallocation of resources. For several factors, aside from tastes, help to de-
termine the appearance of properties. The situation which we have described, where
individually rational action may lead to no investment and deterioration, is only one
type of case. Another may be based on the distribution of incomes. Poor classes
can hardly be expected to afford the spacious and comfortable quarters of the well-to-
do. Indeed, given the existence of low income households, a slum area may represent
an efficient use of resources. If the existence of slums per se violates one's ethical
standards, then, as economists, we can only point out that for elimination of slums
the main economic concern must be with the distribution of income, and urban
renewal is not sufficient to solve that problem. Indeed, unless some action is taken
to alter the distribution of income, the renewal of slum areas is likely to lead to the
creation of slum areas elsewhere.2 It is to be emphasized that slums may or may
not satisfy the definition of a blighted area. On the other hand, the mere fact
that the properties in some given area appear "nice" to the eye is not sufficient evi-
dence to indicate that blight (by our definition) is absent.
One additional remark of clarification seems warranted. It is obvious that not
all individuals are free to purchase or rent property in all areas of the metropolis.
Discrimination-e.g., by race-may create two or more "separate" markets, and there
seems to be no reason to suspect short-run equilibrium in the sense of investment
return between markets. We simply note here that, granted the discrimination, this
fact does not affect our definition of blight, nor does it alter the proposals which we
shall present.
"It is a curious fact that renewal seems to be regarded as a "cure" for slum areas. For, granted
the distribution" of income and the fact that the poor-classes simply cannot afford to pay high enough
rents to warrant the more spacious and confortable quarters, the renewal of all slum areas, unless accom-
panied by an income-subsidy program, would only be self-defeating and lead to social waste. Renewal
of all slum areas could cause rents for the "nicer" quarters to fall temporarily within the possible range
of the poor classes, but the rents would not be sufficiently high to warrant expenditures by the landlord to
maintain the structure. New slums would appear, calling for more renewal activity. This process would
simply continue. On the other hand, efficient slum-removal programs are possible, and one will be
presented at a later point in this paper.
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III
A BRIEF CRITIQUE OF PRESENT PRACTICES
Having seen that, due to externalities or interdependencies and the difficulty of
tract assembly, individually rational action may allow blight to develop, we now
turn our attention to questions of public policy. It bears repeating that wherever
our definition of blight is satisfied, then resources are misallocated in the sense
that some institutional arrangement-some means--exists under which redevelop-
ment or renewal could profitably be carried out. The problem is to discover that
institutional arrangement. We begin our search by examining briefly the relevant
aspects of the present practices.
Title I of the Housing Act of 19491' seems to have set the general pattern for
urban renewal practices. While the Act of 1954"' broadened the concept, the general
formula for urban redevelopment remains essentially unchanged. Both federal loans
and capital grants are provided for the projects. Loans are generally for the purpose
of providing working capital. The capital grants may cover up to two-thirds of the
net cost of the project, with the remainder of the funds being provided by either
state or local sources.'
5
The striking fact about the present program, and also about many of the proposals
for extending that program, is the utter lack of a relevant criterion for expenditures.
How much should be invested in urban renewal? How does one determine whether
projects are really worthwhile? Does the present program attempt to "correct" the
allocation of resources or does it simply result in further misallocation? There
seems to have been little or no serious effort to find answers to these questions.
In fact, it is widely admitted that there is a lack of adequate criteria even to
determine what projects should be undertaken.'0
It seems evident from the statements of mayors and others who propose expansions
of the present program that the need approach to governmental expenditures under-
lies their suggestions. That is to say, a certain project "needs" to be carried out; and,
granted this requirement, money is sought for the project. It should be evident that
this approach to governmental expenditures may not result in the correct allocation
of resources. The need approach obscures budgetary considerations and makes com-
parison of alternatives difficult, since a need is simply assumed without reference
to other possible areas of expenditure. The need approach is arbitrary and overlooks
2063 Stat. 413, 42 U.S.C. §5 1441-60 (i958).
"468 Stat. 622, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §5 1450-62 (958); 68 Stat. 596, as amended, 12 U.S.C.
SS 1715s, 17151 (1958).
"There are, of course, conditions which must be satisfied before a community can be eligible for
federal funds. See, e.g., COMM'S ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIoN's, TWENTY-FIVE FEDERIAL GRANT-
ZN-AuD PRoAS (1955).
'A remark by Morton J. Schussheim, Deputy Director of the Area Development Division of the
Committee for Economic Development, is interesting in this respect. Mr. Schusshcim writes, "It is true
. . . that local olfcials responsible for urban rcnewal programs do not have adequate criteria for deter-
mining what projects to undertake and on what scale." A Pure Theory of Urban Renewal: .A Comment.
34 LAND EcoN oIcs 395 (ig6o).
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the return on investment, an extremely important consideration for the problem of
a rational allocation of resources. 1
IV
REDISTRIBUTION, THE COST-BENEFIT CRITERION, AND URBAN RENEWAL
Having pointed out that the existing institutional arrangements concerning urban'
renewal contain no explicit criterion for determining either the amount of such
expenditure or when a project is desirable, we now propose the previously introduced
benefits-cost criterion and will discuss later the institutional arrangements under
which it could be applied. First, however, let us detail more fully our use of this
criterion and the reasons for its selection.
We assume that income and utility are positively correlated. This means that
if potential benefits, appropriately-defined, exceed costs, then the conditions for
Pareto optimality, in the absence of corrective measures, are not filled. It is possible
for some action to be taken which will make one or more persons better-off without
making anyone worse off.18 In this context, the action will take the form of in-
vestment in urban renewal.
It is to be emphasized again that the benefits-cost criterion refers only to the
problem of efficiency-i.e, to the allocation of resources on the basis of a given
distribution of income. However, it is possible to design programs which do
redistribute income but which still are completely compatible with the benefit-cost
criterion. The point is that the two problems-distribution and allocation-must be
kept conceptually separate.
Given the fact that interdependencies are a cause of blight, two kinds of action
are possible-preventive and reconstructive. We consider first preventive action
As was pointed out earlier, the problem in preventing the development of blight
consists essentially in finding methods of coordinating the decisions about investmer:
in repair and upkeep so that the socially and individually desirable choices are
equated. One step in this direction can be made through the development and
use of a special type of building code which bears a superficial resemblance to
municipal zoning.19 It can be seen from the Prisoner's Dilemma example discussed
earlier that it is individually desirable to invest if there is assurance that all individuals
" It may be commonplace to point out that there exists for any given social action a social welfare
function which is maximal for that action, and by definition this resource allocation is optimal. Our
point is simply that it seems dubious that a type of need approach,to forming criteria is reasonable, given
that urban problems are not unique as a social problem.
"'It is easy to see the exact relation between benefits-costs and the Pareto condition. If the sum of
benefits exceeds the sum of costs for some particular action, then although some individual might be
made worse off by the action, it is theoretically possible to pay compensation to that individual so that
the Pareto condition will be satisfied.
" It is to be emphasized that the building code envisioned* here bears only a superficial resemblance
to zoning. The two tools are aimed at different problems. Municipal zoning tries to prevent the establish-
ment of "undesirable" properties in specified neighborhoods. These special building codes would be
aimed at the elimination of interdependencies affecting repair and upkeep decisions. For an elaboration
on the complexities involved in municipal zoning, see Davis & Whinston, The Economics of Complex
Systems: The Case of Municipal Zoning (O.N.R. Research Memorandum, Graduate School of Industrial
Administration, Carnegie Institute of Technology, ig6r).
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will be constrained to make a similar decision. The special building code specifying
minimum levels of repair and upkeep can provide a rough approximation toward
optimal levels of coordination.
A brief outline of the scheme follows: Since it is intuitively obvious that different
types of property require different kinds of repair and types of upkeep, it would seem
desirable that these building codes differ according to the type property under
consideration. The role of the planner would be to try to determine the proper
restrictions for each type of property. He could try to gather information on inter-
action effects through the use of statistical sampling techniques and questionnaires.
He then could draw up districts and try to estimate the proper level of the building
code for each district. A crude approximation to the benefit-cost criterion is easily
supplied. It is advantageous to Property owners mutually to constain themselves
to make "appropriate" repair expenditures, for this coordinates decisions. Therefore,
the planner can simply submit the proposed code for each district to the property
owners of that district; if the planner has proposed an appropriate code, then mutual
consent should be forthcoming. If mutual consent is not obtained, then it would
seem suitable to assume that the proper code for the district has not been proposed
and that a new proposal would be necessary.20
While codes adopted via the above scheme should be helpful in preventing blight,
it must be noted that implementation of this plan would require the selection of an
appropriate institutional and legal framework. As economists, we do not pretend
to know the legal difficulties which might be involved; but a joint effort by the two
professions to set up the framework for such a scheme seems to us to be desirable.
Let us now turn our attention to the policy problem when blight is already in
existence. Present practices provide something of a framework here; what is
missing is a relevant criterion. Of course, it should be noted that it may sometimes
be possible to obtain redevelopment through individual effort via the previously-
stated special-building-code method. In other instances, the optimal property uses
may have changed from what they formerly were. The area may be composed of
lots too small to obtain an orderly transition of property uses by means of the
building code. It may be desirable to replan streets, or other reasons may be
advanced for the usual type of urban renewal effort. Therefore, let us try to de-
termine the appropriate comparison of costs and benefits when the usual type
renewal activity takes place.
Let us assume that the city government has marked some blighted area for
redevelopment. Taking the property tax rate as given, suppose that the city has
raised funds for the project by selling bonds. With the money thus raised, the city
has purchased the blighted area, using the right of eminent domain wherever needed.
" Our use of the term "mutual consent" may represent something of a subterfuge. In actuality, it
may not be desirable to insist on unanimity nor would it seem desirable to use a simple majority.
Something on the order of eighty to ninety per cent may be reasonable. For a discussion of the problems
involved in voting and the difficulties associated with the selection of political decision rules, see the
unpublished manuscript by JAssS M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, ThE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
(mimeo.) (Department of Economics, University of Virginia, x959).
j16 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Suppose that the city has demolished the outdated structures, made adequate pro-
vision for public services, and then, having finished its part of the operation, sold lots
to entrepreneurs who have agreed in advance to build, say, modern apartment
buildings.
Note what city action has accomplished. It has removed the obstacles to private
renewal. The right of eminent domain has removed the possibility of price-
gouging and stubborn property owners acting so as to prevent the assembly of a
large enough tract. Each entrepreneur who buys the lots from the city is assured
that adjoining lots will also be suitably developed, so that interaction difficulties arc
eliminated.
One fact needs great emphasis here. The elimination of externalities or inter-
action effects causes social and private products to be equated. Therefore, if possible
redistribution is left aside; and if for the moment problems.are waived which arise
from public projects where the market mechanism does not serve as an adequate
guide, then it can be stated that revenues and expenditures can be made identical to
costs and benefits. Therefore, renewal projects are warranted if, and only if,
revenues exceed expenditures. And, even where problems associated with redistribu-
tion and public projects are not waived, it is still possible to make the revenue-
expenditure criterion approximate the benefit-cost criterion, although some admin-
istrative difficulties. are involved.
What are the appropriate comparisons of costs and benefits? Consider first the
case without the complications. The costs of the local government include the
acquisition of land, demolition and improvements, aiding the relocation of displaced
families, and interest expenses. 1 The measurement of revenues is slightly more
complicated. The primary item, of course, would be receipts from the sale of lots.
Since we are dealing with local government, however, a tax on real property will
exist. Since the discounted value of the tax is likely to be shifted onto the im-
mobile resource-land-it is necessary to account for this factor. If the project
is successful, the new structures should have a higher value than the old; so there
should be a net addition to tax revenues. This net addition should be discounted
to a present value and counted as a receipt from the project. Thus, a comparison of
revenues and expenses is possible, and the project is warranted only if revenues
exceed expenses.
We now consider the second case with the additional complications. Note that
the previous discussion still applies here, with the following qualifications upon the
administrative rules involved. If public projects such as parks, playgrounds, public
buildings, and so forth, are planned in conjunction with the renewal effort, then
estimates of the social benefit to be derived from these projects must be made by the
" Peculiarly enough, the present-day requirement that individuals be paid for their property and
the administrative rule of aiding individuals who may be dislocated to find new quarters affords a
method of approximate compensation so that the Pareto condition can be satisfied.
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governmental unit or units which ordinarily pay for them.' 2 These cstimated benefits
are to be considered as revenues from the renewal effort, and the appropriate govern-
mental units are to be required to contribute these amounts to the authority which.
administers the renewal activity. Thus the revenue-expenditure criterion should
very closely approximate the benefits-cost criterion, depending, of course, upon how
well the governmental units estimate the social benefits derived from the special
public projects.
If there happens to exist some agreed-upon ethical distribution of income, then.
we point out first that urban renewal is not an efficient method of achieving redis-
tribution. Possible benefits might accrue to special groups instead of the low-income
classes. Other methods for simple redistribution exist which should be preferred
to urban renewal. However, if the ethical distribution is connected with some
arbitrary housing standard below which conditions are viewed 'as inadequate for
"decent living," the cost-benefit criterion need not be rendered useless. Conditional.
subsidies could be granted to the low income households living in substandard
housing. Thse subsidies would make it possible for the cost-benefit criterion to work
effectively for renewal purposes.
Several corollaries to the cost-benefit criterion should be pointed out. If problems
of ethical income distribution are waived, then from the standpoint of a rational
allocation of resources, no federal or state subsidies are needed for urban renewal
purposes per se. Of course, the adjustments made for the second case may have-
to be accomplished, but note that in reality these are based upon considerations not
directly dependent upon urban renewal. Renewal projects should not lose money..
Indeed, they should result in a profit. On the other hand, granted the fact that
constitutional and/or statutory debt limits have often been imposed upon local
governments, these should be waived for borrowing for urban renewal purposes..
Finally, the local governments should be granted the power of eminent domain for
urban renewal purposes.
CONCLUSION
In arriving at these indications for the use of the cost-benefit criterion in urban
renewal, we started with the Pareto condition. However, it was suggested that
other social welfare functions, which allow for income redistribution or even mini--
mum condition housing, need not affect the usefulness of this criterion as long as the
rational allocation of resources is viewed as a conceptually separate problem. It is to be
emphasized that for the purpose of urban renewal, conceptual separation of the two
problems can be achieved through the methods outlined above.
"We assume that the units which ordinarily pay for this type of public projects arc identical to
the units which derive the benefits from these projects. If this is not the case, then further administrative-
adjustments have to be made, but these adjustments should be made anyway and should not be de-
pendent upon possible urban renewal projects.
